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INTRODUCTION OF THE CISG-AC 
The CISG-AC started as a private initiative supported by the 
Institute of International Commercial Law at Pace University School of 
Law and the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary, University 
of London. The International Sales Convention Advisory Council 
(CISGAC) is in place to support understanding of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and 
the promotion and assistance in the uniform interpretation of the CISG. 
At its formative meeting in Paris in June 2001, Prof. Peter Schlechtriem 
of Freiburg University, Germany, was elected Chair of the CISG-AC for 
a three-year term. Dr. Loukas A. Mistelis of the Centre for Commercial 
Law Studies, Queen Mary, University of London, was elected Secretary. 
The founding members of the CISG-AC were Prof. Emeritus Eric E. 
Bergsten, Pace University School of Law; Prof. Michael Joachim Bonell, 
University of Rome La Sapienza; Prof. E. Allan Farnsworth, Columbia 
University School of Law; Prof. Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University 
School of Law; Prof. Sir Roy M. Goode, Oxford, Prof. Sergei N. Lebedev, 
Maritime Arbitration Commission of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of the Russian Federation; Prof. Jan Ramberg, University of 
Stockholm, Faculty of Law; Prof. Peter Schlechtriem, Freiburg University; 
Prof. Hiroo Sono, Faculty of Law, Hokkaido University; Prof. Claude 
Witz, Universität des Saarlandes and Strasbourg University. Members of 
the Council are elected by the Council. At subsequent meetings, the 
CISGAC elected as additional members Prof. Pilar Perales Viscasillas, 
Universidad Carlos III, Madrid; Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer, 
University of Basel; Prof. John Y Gotanda, Villanova University; Prof. 
Michael G. Bridge, London School of Economics; Prof. Han Shiyuan, 
Tsinghua University, Prof. Yesim Atamer, Istanbul Bilgi University, 
Turkey, and Prof. Ulrich Schroeter, University of Mannheim. Prof. Jan 
Ramberg served for a three-year term as the second Chair of the CISGAC. 
At its 11th meeting in Wuhan, People’s Republic of China, Prof. Eric E. 
Bergsten of Pace University School of Law was elected Chair of the CISG-
AC and Prof. Sieg Eiselen of the Department of Private Law of the 
University of South Africa was elected Secretary. At its 14th meeting in 
Belgrade, Serbia, Prof. Ingeborg Schwenzer of the University of Basel was 
elected Chair of the CISGAC. 
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1. OPINION 
1. Monetary claims governed by the CISG, whether they arise out of 
the same contract or not, may be set off by either party in conformity with 
the general principles underlying the CISG. 
2. Set-off has the same effect as the performance of a monetary 
obligation by payment. 
3. Set-off is exercised by a declaration made by notice. The notice 
must reach the other party but does not take effect before both claims are 
due.  
4. Exercising the right to set off does not require the claims to be 
liquidated or to be in the same currency. 
5. The applicability of the CISG to set-off does not affect matters of 
res judicata or counterclaims. 
2. COMMENTS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
0.1 A set-off of monetary claims is usually referred to as the 
mechanism by which the amount which a party owes to the other party is 
reduced by the amount that the second party owes to the first, to the effect 
that that first party only has to pay the balance.  The CISG does not use 
the term ‘set-off’, whereas it is often used in case law and legal writing 
relating to the Convention. The notion ‘set-off’ is also found in numerous 
international legal uniform instruments, such as the 1974 Limitation 
Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions, the 
UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables and the Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (hereafter the PICC).  
0.2 The CISG does not explicitly address the question of set-off. 
This might explain, at least in part, why the majority of case law and 
authors hold that a set-off arising out of a contract governed by the 
Convention is subject to the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private 
international law, in accordance with article 7(2) in fine.  Only a few cases 
or authors explain this view. Those who do generally consider that the 
CISG does not only not provide for any express rules on set-off, but that 
such rules cannot be derived from the existing provisions either.  More 
recently, however, the highest instance courts in some Contracting States, 
including the German Supreme Court, the Austrian Supreme Court and, 
implicitly, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, have held that a set-off of claims 
governed by the CISG falls within the scope of the Convention if both 
claims arise out of the same contract. The applicability of the CISG to a 
set-off in such a constellation has also been admitted by numerous other 
courts and authors.   
0.3 The case law applying the CISG to a set-off usually does so 
implicitly. Typically, a judgment will order the defendant to pay only the 
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difference between the claimant’s and his own claim; as this is done 
without searching for a specific law that would govern set-off, it must be 
inferred that the court impliedly admits the application of the Convention.   
0.4 It is the goal of this Opinion and its comments to elaborate the 
question of set-off under the CISG, to work out the details of the 
provisions and general principles of the Convention, and to provide for a 
unified approach to set-off within the four corners of the CISG. The 
Advisory Council is of the opinion that such a unified solution from within 
the Convention is consistent with the nature, the scope of application, and 
the goals of the CISG. Furthermore, a unified approach derived from the 
Convention avoids the complexity and unpredictability that are linked to 
the application of domestic law to a set-off. In fact, the domestic laws of 
set-off may differ considerably from one another.   
0.5 Thus, the ‘Latin’ model, found in French law and the many legal 
systems influenced by the French Code civil, provides that set-off takes 
place ipso iure (automatically) as of the time two parties hold mutual 
claims against each other.  There is an automatic discharge of those mutual 
obligations to the extent of their respective amounts, even without the 
parties’ knowledge. The claims need not arise out of the same contract or 
be otherwise connected, but because Latin set-off operates automatically, 
both claims must be due, ascertained, and enforceable. As set-off takes 
place as soon as the claims coexist, neither party is in default from that 
time on; the duty to pay interest on a sum ceases to exist at that moment, 
and any contractual penalties do not become due. All the described 
elements show that Latin set-off is an automatism provided by substantive 
law. The court or arbitral tribunal only finds (‘constater’) that the claims 
have been set off. 
0.6 Set-off under the German model is a matter of substantive law 
too. Unlike French law however, which imposes set-off on both parties, 
the German model gives the parties just the right to declare set-off.  If 
there is no set-off declaration, the claims continue to exist independently 
from each other until they are extinguished by fulfilment of the respective 
obligations. German set-off thus considers set-off as a defence 
(figuratively speaking; it is not a judicial defence of procedural law); the 
party wishing to set off intends the extinction of the claims, whereas the 
other party arguably does not. This explains why, under German law, the 
claim with which set-off is declared must be enforceable, that is, 
admissible for legal action: the addressee of the set-off declaration must 
accept the extinction of its claim only if and insofar as the other party 
could claim fulfilment of its own claim. In contrast, the claim against 
which set-off is declared need be neither due nor enforceable. The claims 
need not arise out of the same contract or otherwise be connected with 
each other, and, unlike French law, they need not be liquidated either. 
Interestingly, and for historical reasons, set-off has retroactive effect: once 
set-off has been declared, the two claims are considered as having been 
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extinguished as of the time they were eligible for set-off, as is the case 
under French set-off.  
0.7 The common law provides for several categories of set-off.  To 
take English law as an example, the traditional way of set-off is an 
instrument of procedural law (independent set-off, statutory set-off). It is 
only available in a pending action, and only if both claims are liquidated. 
Set-off is brought about as of the date of judgment. Until that date, the 
claims continue to exist. Interest accrues and penalty clauses apply. 
Besides independent set-off, English courts have developed another type 
of set-off which is said to be an instrument of substantive law (equitable 
set-off, transaction set-off). Its effect, however, differs from the law of 
set-off of civil law jurisdictions. The debtor who, himself, has a claim 
against the creditor may deduct the sum owed to him and pay just the 
balance, very much like in German and French law. Alternatively, the 
debtor may ask for an injunction which will preclude the creditor from 
claiming his debt in full before judgment. But the two claims remain in 
existence until they are extinguished by judgment. Equitable set-off does 
thus not qualify as a purely substantive defence since it is the judgment 
which brings about the set-off. Once set-off has been pronounced by the 
court, the debtor who has already deducted the amount owed to him from 
the creditor’s claim is not considered as having been in default until the 
pronouncement of set-off by the court. There is thus a partial retroactive 
effect to equitable set-off. Equitable set-off only operates where both 
claims arise out of the same transaction. It is not required that they arise 
from the same contract, but the claim which is set off against the creditor’s 
claim must be inseparably connected with the transaction that gave rise to 
the first claim. Furthermore, the party invoking set-off must show some 
equitable ground for being protected from its adversary’s demand; the 
court may deny set-off, despite the fact that both claims are closely 
connected, if the case does not give rise to an equity. The lack of 
ascertainment of the debtor’s claim may prevent equitable set-off. The 
court has considerable leeway. Finally, another category of English set-off 
is abatement, which has a very narrow scope. It is limited to contracts for 
the sale of goods or for work and labour and allows the buyer or customer 
to deduct from the seller’s or contractor’s claim a reasonable amount 
corresponding to the diminution in value of the goods or services 
provided. It is very much comparable to the right of price reduction in 
Article 50 CISG. A similar mechanism is provided in the American 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in section 2-717 (‘The buyer on 
notifying the seller of his intention to do so may deduct all or any part of 
the damages resulting from any breach of the contract from any part of 
the price still due under the same contract.’). In a contractual context, US 
law may allow for the equitable defence of ‘recoupment’, defined as the 
setting up of a demand arising from the same transaction as the plaintiff's 
claim, to abate or reduce that claim.  UCC, § 2-717 and recoupment are 
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considered as different to actual set-off, the latter being similar to English 
independent set-off.  
0.8 Differences among the various domestic laws do not only 
concern the mechanism of set-off as such, but also conflict of laws rules 
applicable to set-off. This concerns not so much the choice-of-law rules 
in Europe, where the Rome I Regulation provides for the same choice-of-
law regime for all Member States except for Denmark. But differences 
remain on a global level and especially in international arbitration, where 
manifold theories and approaches exist.   
0.9 The short and, certainly, to some extent schematic overview 
shows that the questions of whether there is a possibility for set-off, how 
set-off is brought about and what its effects are, are answered differently 
depending on the applicable domestic law. The differences are 
considerable. They lead to a certain complexity and, as the case may be, 
unpredictability of the case. These difficulties are exacerbated by the wide 
variety of existing conflict of laws rules; they add to the said 
unpredictability – an unpredictability that the parties who have chosen the 
CISG as a unified law certainly wished to avoid. These elements taken 
together invite knowledgeable parties to forum shop and lead to 
unforeseen situations for less informed parties.  
0.10 In contracts governed by the Convention, the difficulties 
described arise when set-off is regarded as an issue not governed by the 
Convention, to be determined by the applicable rules of private 
international law at the place of the court and to be resolved under national 
law (Article 7 para. 2 in fine). The difficulties do not arise if the question 
of whether the buyer and the seller under a CISG contract may set off 
their mutual claims can be answered by the Convention itself (Article 7 
para. 2 in initio). The Advisory Council is of the opinion that the set-off 
of claims governed by the CISG is a matter governed by the Convention 
for which the general principles on which the CISG is based provide clear 
and adequate rules for the characteristic aspects of such a set-off between 
seller and buyer. It has therefore adopted the rules that are presented and 
explained in detail below. Standards  
1.1. Many products today have some corresponding standard(s) 
concerning their composition, features, such as health and safety, or the 
process to be followed in making them. A standard can be understood as 
a benchmark or a level of quality or attainment, with reference to which 
something is evaluated or the compliance with which is desirable or 
expected.1 The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) 
defines a standard as ‘a document that provides requirements, 
specifications, guidelines or characteristics that can be used consistently to 
ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their 
purpose’.2 It is helpful to distinguish ‘public’ from ‘private’ standards. The 
former are adopted by state organisations, often being contained in public 
law regulations, or by inter-governmental organisations, such the United 
Nations, International Labour Organisation or Codex Alimentarius 
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Commission.3 Public standards can be mandatory or voluntary. Other 
standards are ‘private’ in the sense that they are produced by non-state 
bodies, initiatives, associations and organisations. These can be: 
companies, adopting their own standards or codes of conduct, (such as 
Tesco Nature’s Choice)4; national industry bodies, such as the British 
Retail Consortium (BRC) and its BRC Global Standards;5 international 
consortia of companies and their global standards, such as GlobalG.A.P. 
(‘Good Agricultural Practice’),6 the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI)7 
or the Equator Principles (EP) Association;8 international organisations 
that adopt standards across various industries and sectors, such as the ISO 
that adopts standards in a wide range of areas, including technology, food 
safety, agriculture, healthcare, environment;9 civil society, represented by 
non-profit non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as the 
Fairtrade Foundation10 that promulgate what might called ‘ethical’ 
standards, concerning human rights, child labour and other labour 
standards, environmental protection, sustainability and corruption. Being 
adopted by non-state actors, private standards are voluntary. However, 
they can become mandatory or quasi-mandatory.11 The former is the case 
where a private standard is incorporated into a national regulatory 
framework.12 The example of the latter is where standards are applied by 
the majority of businesses in a particular sector and/or where compliance 
with such standards is required by large companies (usually, buyers) 
dominating the relevant sector or supply chain.13 
1.2. The existence of such standards raises the question of their 
relationship with the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) that governs the rights and obligations of the parties 
arising from a ‘contract’ of the sale of goods. Being a contract law 
instrument that seeks to assign duties, risks, liabilities and remedies 
between the two contracting parties, the CISG is not concerned with 
giving effect to any such standards. However, buyers often claim that 
sellers breach a contract and/or the Convention if the goods do not meet 
a particular public or private standard. An important question therefore is: 
to what extent should such standards be taken into account in defining the 
seller’s obligations as to the conformity of goods under Article 35 CISG? 
This Opinion addresses this question, providing guidance as to the degree 
to which standards should be taken into account in interpreting a contract, 
governed by the CISG, and Article 35 CISG. 
1.3. It is increasingly recognised that the conformity of goods 
comprises the relationship of the goods with their surrounding 
environment, of which standards are an important part.14 Thus, the 
conformity of goods should in principle be determined not only by their 
quantity, quality, description, or packaging, but also by compliance with 
standards affecting the use of the goods. According to Article 35(1) CISG, 
the ‘conformity’ of goods comprises their quantity, quality, description, 
containment or packaging. Standards, whether public or private, are often 
concerned with these aspects of conformity, as well as with many others, 
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such as technical, ethical, environmental and health and safety 
considerations and/or the process of designing, manufacturing or 
producing the goods. It must also be stressed that when interpreting the 
contract under Article 35(1), regard must be had to all relevant 
circumstances, as is made clear by Article 8(3) CISG.15 Given that 
standards deal with various aspects and features of the goods, the 
standards can be such a ‘relevant circumstance’ or factor that must be 
taken into account when interpreting the contract.  
1.4. Some key terms as to the conformity of goods, implied under 
Article 35(2), focus on the use of the goods. Article 35(2)(b) is concerned 
with the seller’s obligations where a particular purpose, for which the 
goods are intended to be used, has been made known to the seller. Article 
35(2)(a), in turn, provides a fall-back rule, according to which goods are to 
be ‘fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would 
ordinarily be used’.16 Standards can affect the use of the goods, whether it 
is the use flowing from the particular purpose under Article 35(2)(b) or 
the ordinary use under Article 35(2)(a), including their containment or 
packaging (Article 35(2)(d)). Thus, if a standard is contained in public law 
regulations, the use of the goods may be affected if they do not comply 
with this standard. Even if a standard is not mandatory, companies in a 
given market, sector or supply chain may have to comply with such a 
standard in order to enter, remain in the market or carry on business 
effectively if such compliance is expected by within that market or sector17 
and/or required by a company dominating a supply chain (usually, the 
buyer).18 
2.2. SPECIFIC COMMENTS 
2.2.1.  1. MONETARY CLAIMS GOVERNED BY THE CISG, WHETHER THEY 
ARISE OUT OF THE SAME CONTRACT OR NOT, MAY BE SET OFF BY 
EITHER PARTY IN CONFORMITY WITH THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
UNDERLYING THE CISG.  
1.1 Monetary claims. The rule formulates the principle that the 
Convention governs the set-off of monetary claims, for example, where 
the seller claims the purchase price whereas the buyer claims damages,19 
or where the buyer claims restitution of the price and the seller counters 
with a claim for damages,20 or where the seller demands the equalization 
of benefits further to the avoidance of the contract and the buyer relies on 
damages,21 or certain other constellations.22 Non-monetary claims are not 
considered. In fact, even though the PICC, the PECL or domestic laws 
standing in a civil law tradition provide for a right to set off claims relating 
to goods of the same kind (‘similar goods’, ‘fungible goods’), the situation 
where the buyer and the seller hold reciprocal claims relating to goods of 
the same kind will hardly arise under the CISG, as the Convention governs 
sales contracts, that is, contracts referring to the exchange of goods against 
money. The situations in which a set-off of claims relating to the ‘same 
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kind of goods’ are of practical importance, such as a set-off of obligations 
for company shares or other negotiable papers, or goods in futures 
trading23, have been excluded from the scope of application of the CISG 
(Article 2(d)). To the extent the CISG applies to barter agreements24, it is 
very unlikely that the barter agreement involves goods of the same kind. 
1.2 Set-off as a matter governed by the CISG. The set-off of 
monetary claims both governed by the CISG is to be settled in conformity 
with the general principles underlying the Convention. Even though the 
CISG does not state explicit general rules for set-off, it acknowledges the 
principle of set-off as such. For instance, where the party bound to 
preserve the goods sells those goods, Article 88(3) states that that party is 
entitled to retain from the proceeds of sale its reasonable expenses of 
preserving and selling the goods. Provisions of the CISG other than 
Article 88(3), without expressly providing for a right of set-off, state the 
rule that performance must be made concurrently (Articles 58(1), 81(2)). 
The principle of concurrent performance and the right of set-off are based 
on a similar idea. In both cases, the main rationale is to prevent a party 
from recovering all that is owed to it while the other party is left with the 
risk of having to assert its claim before a court or arbitral tribunal.25 
1.3 Articles 58(1), 81(2), 88(3) reflect the idea of a fair balance of 
interests in the course of exchanging performances. As far as Article 88(3) 
is concerned, the CISG focuses on an efficient and expedited way for 
settling reciprocal money debts between the parties. Ultimately, the 
provisions deal with the way in which mutual payment obligations are 
performed; the question is a ‘matter governed by this Convention’ (Article 
7(2)).  
1.4 Set-off is the accentuated version of concurrent performance. To 
take the situation dealt with in Article 88(3), if the buyer sold the goods 
on account of the seller for, say, $10,000 and had preservation and selling 
costs of $800, the buyer, in strict application of the principle of concurrent 
performance, would give $10,000 to the seller and would receive, a couple 
of seconds later, $800 from him. This to and fro shifting of sums of money 
can be cut short in that the buyer pays only the difference between the 
resale price and his costs, that is, $9,200. Instead of proceeding to a real 
concurrent exchange of a sum of money against another sum of money, 
the exchange is merely ‘virtual’; it ‘happens’ when calculating the 
difference between the sums that the parties owe each other.26 Article 
88(3) explicitly provides for this manner to ‘accelerate’ concurrent 
performance. The Convention does not limit this way to proceed to the 
situation of Article 88(3). On the contrary, it is inherent in the ideas 
underlying the principle of concurrent performance, namely a fair 
distribution of risks as well as efficiency, that a party may limit itself to 
paying the difference between its own and the other party’s claim instead 
of having to engage in an effective exchange of sums. This mere paying of 
the difference is the characteristic of a set-off as it is understood under the 
CISG (see above, para. 0.1). The Advisory Council has already had the 
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occasion to state that ‘a general denial of set-off as a subject dealt with by 
the Convention is too widely stated’27, and has admitted that ‘concurrency 
in making restitution … is most effectively promoted by permitting set-
off’28. In this Opinion, the Advisory Council confirms its position whilst 
broadening the scope by holding that the set-off of monetary claims 
arising from the CISG is a question governed by the Convention, even if 
the only place where it is settled expressly is Article 88(3).29  
1.5 Application of general principles of the CISG. Matters 
governed by the CISG but not expressly settled in it are subject to the 
general principles on which the Convention is based, unless no such 
general principles exist (Article 7 para. 2). Black letter rule No. 1 states the 
rule that a set-off of monetary claims arising under the CISG are governed 
by the Convention’s general principles. The rationale behind this rule is 
twofold: (a) the setting off of monetary claims is a mode of payment; (b) 
from the rules of the CISG regarding payment, general principles can be 
derived that indicate the way a set-off can take place, as well as its effects. 
The content of each of those general principles, their legal basis, and their 
application to set-off are exposed in detail in the comment on Rules No. 
2 to 4. For some specific questions, no general principle can be derived 
from the Convention; those questions are therefore governed by the 
otherwise applicable law (Article 7 para. 2 in fine). However, this shall not 
hinder the application of the CISG to the other aspects of the set-off 
(below, paras 4.8 et seq.).  
1.6 Claims governed by the CISG. The cases (quite numerous by 
now) where the Convention has been held to apply to a set-off all 
concerned claims that were both governed by the CISG (see above, para. 
0.2). As far as can be seen, it has never happened so far that the 
Convention was applied in a situation where one of the claims in a set-off 
had its legal basis in a law other than the CISG. This is in line with the 
view of this Opinion. In fact, as is generally known, the Convention is 
limited in its scope: it governs the buyer’s and the seller’s claims arising 
out of the sales contract, but does not deal with other, not sales-specific 
claims, such as claims in tort or unjust enrichment, or claims relying on 
the invalidity of the contract (Article 4). Those claims are governed by the 
law designated by the applicable choice-of-law rules (Article 7 para. 2). It 
is thus that other law, and not the CISG, that states whether such a claim 
has arisen, whether it must be asserted or whether courts and arbitral 
tribunals must consider it ex lege, whether it is subject to time limits, etc.  
1.7 The fact that those claims are outside the scope of the CISG thus 
excludes the applicability of the Convention to a set-off that would include 
such a ‘CISG-external’ claim. This is based on the following 
considerations. A set-off is a way to perform monetary obligations which 
is not explicitly settled in the Convention (cf. above, para. 1.4, and below, 
para. 2). The CISG deals with performance and, more specifically, with 
payment only as far as the parties’ duties arising out of the sales contract 
stricto sensu are concerned. From those rules on performance and payment, 
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general principles can be derived. Those general principles are applicable 
to ‘matters governed by the Convention’ (Article 7 para. 2). As for the 
matters not governed by the CISG, Article 7 para. 2 cannot dictate that 
they be governed by general principles of the CISG, as this is a question 
that has to be answered by the law governing that CISG-external matter. 
In other words, set-off is a matter of the CISG only to the extent it 
concerns claims arising out of the CISG, and it is only with regard to such 
a set-off that the CISG can stipulate the application of its general 
principles. Thus, the CISG’s general principles can only be applied to set-
off to the extent that the set-off is between ‘CISG-internal’ claims.  
1.8 Claims arising out of the same contract or out of different 
contracts. Rule No. 1 states the rule that, as long as both claims are 
governed by the CISG, the fact that the claims do not arise out of the 
same contract does not prevent the application of the Convention to the 
set-off. The reason for this will be explained in relation with Rule No. 5 
(below, paras 5.1 et seq.). 
1.9 Parties’ agreement taking precedence. Rule No. 1 does not 
explicitly state that the parties may derogate from or vary the rules on set-
off derived from the general rules of the Convention. These possibilities 
are a matter of course, derived from Article 6 of the CISG. In practice, the 
parties do often provide for contractual arrangements. They may, for 
instance, agree that, in a specific case, their mutual claims do not have to 
be settled in kind, but that only the party that owes the greater amount will 
pay it to the other party (also called ‘set-off by agreement’). Especially in 
long-standing business relationships, the parties may also provide for so-
called ‘netting’ clauses, in which the parties agree on a mechanism of 
continuous discharge of liabilities.30 Contrariwise, the parties may also 
exclude the possibility of setting off claims which they hold against each 
other. This too is not unusual31 and usually serves the purpose of 
preserving a party’s cash flow. Common ways of excluding the right to 
set-off are payment clauses such as ‘net cash’, ‘cash on delivery’, ‘cash 
against documents’ or ‘documents against payment’.32 Where no such 
agreement exists, the CISG provides the legal basis for one party’s right 
to set off its claim against the other party’s claim, and without that other 
party’s consent, under the requirements and to the effect derived from the 
Convention’s general principles.  
2.2.2.  2. SET-OFF HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS THE PERFORMANCE OF A 
MONETARY OBLIGATION BY PAYMENT. 
According to the understanding underlying set-off under the CISG, 
set-off produces a balance, which is the difference between both monetary 
claims (above, para. 0.1). The residual amount remains due. This effect is 
explicitly provided for in Article 88(3) CISG, which states that the party 
entitled to resell the goods on account of the other party may retain out 
of the proceeds of the sale the amount corresponding to the reasonable 
expenses of reselling the goods and must account for the balance. The 
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same effect has been accorded in all the other situations where a set-off 
has been admitted under the CISG: the party relying on the set-off is 
exempted from actually paying the claim addressed to it and owes only the 
difference between the two amounts.33 In other words, the party relying 
on set-off does not really pay, but nevertheless fulfils the claim the other 
party has against it, by setting off its own claim against the other party’s 
claim. The payment consists, so to speak, in the fact that the party setting 
off waives/renounces its right to receive actual payment for its own claim. 
Of course, the effect of actual payment and the effect of set-off are not 
exactly identical, because the party faced with the set-off may not accept 
the existence of the other party’s claim and will have to, as the case may 
be, assert this fact in court or before an arbitral tribunal. But this risk on 
behalf of the first party is inherent in a set-off and, to the extent a set-off 
is considered as a matter governed by the Convention (above, para. 1.2), 
accepted as such under the CISG. It is rather the mechanism of set-off as 
it operates under the CISG that matters, and which produces the effect 
that actual payment of the debt would have: the party relying on set-off 
‘pays’ the other party by retaining the sum owed to it and remains liable 
only for the difference.34  
2.2.3.  3. SET-OFF IS EXERCISED BY A DECLARATION MADE BY NOTICE. THE 
NOTICE MUST REACH THE OTHER PARTY BUT DOES NOT TAKE 
EFFECT BEFORE BOTH CLAIMS ARE DUE. 
3.1 Set-off is declared by making notice. In case law dealing with 
set off under the Convention, there is usually only a general indication that 
the defendant is relying on a right of set-off, without further specifications 
of the manner or the modalities in which set-off is evoked.35 Sometimes, 
a set-off is asserted no earlier than during the judicial proceedings.36 
However, there are also some cases in which it is clear that a set-off has 
been ‘claimed’ or ‘effectuated’ before judicial proceedings were 
commenced.37  
3.2 Rule No. 3 poses the principle that a set-off governed by the 
CISG must be declared by making notice to the other party. This is based 
on the following considerations: Set-off is meant to reduce the amount 
owed to the creditor by the amount which the creditor owes to the debtor 
(above, para. 1.4). Either party can rely on set-off, provided that they both 
hold a monetary claim against each other. Set-off avoids the need for each 
party to perform its obligation by making actual payment (above, paras 1.2 
et seq.). Nonetheless, where the parties have not agreed on a netting 
mechanism where mutual debts are automatically balanced on a regular 
basis at an agreed date (above, para. 1.9), set-off usually is of interest to 
one of the parties only, whereas the other party rejects the set-off, often 
by denying the very fact that the first party holds a claim against it, and by 
insisting on actual payment. Because of this constellation, set-off is to be 
considered as a means of defence that is put forward by the party who 
argues that there is no need to make actual payment, since it (that party) 
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has a claim against the other party, too. In other words, the party who 
refers to set-off invokes the right not to make actual payment.  
3.3 Under the Convention, rights which are granted to one of the 
parties have legal effect only if they are declared to the other party. This can 
be derived from a number of provisions, such as Articles 14 et seq (offer 
and acceptance), Article 26 (declaration of avoidance), Article 39 (notice 
of lack of conformity), Articles 47 and 63 (fixing an additional period of 
time), Article 48(2)-(4) (notice of exercising the right to cure), Article 50 
(price reduction), Article 65 (specification concerning features of the 
goods), Article 71 (notice of suspension), Article 72 (notice of avoidance 
for anticipatory breach), Article 73 (notice of avoidance of an instalment 
contract), and Articles 85-88 (notices relating to the duty to preserve the 
goods). Article 88(3), which deals with set-off with respect to the party 
who is entitled to sell the goods which it was bound to preserve, states 
that that party ‘has the right to retain out of the proceeds of sale an amount 
equal to the reasonable expenses of preserving the goods and selling them’ 
and that it ‘must account to the other party for the balance’. By using these 
words, Article 88(3) implicitly requires the party intending to set off to 
express this intention to other party.38  
3.4 Those provisions show that the Convention has subscribed to 
the principle of declaration, meaning that rights on which a party wishes 
to rely under the Convention must be communicated to the other party 
by way of declaration. In fact, as has been pointed out many times, the 
CISG has rejected both the concept that a party’s rights must be asserted 
by way of a judicial claim as well as the concept that rights are effectuated 
ipso facto.39 The principle of declaration applies without exception to all 
rights under the Convention. It can thus easily be identified as a ‘general 
principle on which it is based’ (Article 7 para. 2) and may be used as a basis 
for set-off under the Convention.40 Rule 3, 1st sentence, therefore states 
that a party who wants to rely on a set-off under the CISG must declare it 
to the other party.  
3.5 Absence of form requirements. The Convention is based on 
the principle of freedom from form. This is shown in Article 11, according 
to which a contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by 
writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form,41 and very 
generally in most, if not all other provisions of the CISG, which do not 
reserve a particular form for exercising a right, or for any other kind of 
communication. Accordingly, it has often been said that a ‘general 
principle’ within the meaning of Article 7 para. 2 can be derived, stating 
that all declarations and communications provided for in the Convention 
are free from requirements as to form.42 This general principle can be used 
for set-off under the CISG. Certainly, as set-off is not explicitly settled in 
the Convention, ‘declaring set-off’ is not a declaration expressly provided 
for in the Convention. However, there is unanimity on the point that the 
principle of freedom from form requirements does not only apply to 
declarations explicitly settled in the Convention, but also to declarations 
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referring to matters governed by but not expressly settled in the CISG 
(Article 7 para. 2).43 This is the case as regards set-off (above, para. 1.2). 
The principle of freedom from form requirements is therefore applicable 
to it. Of course, the parties can agree otherwise in the contract and, for 
instance, subject the declaration of set-off to a writing requirement.44 
3.6 The declaration must reach the other party but does not 
take effect before both claims are due. Another question is the point 
in time at which the declaration of set-off becomes effective. The question 
comprises two aspects. The first point to be answered is the moment in 
time from which on the declaration is considered as having been made 
(below (a)). The second point concerns the question of when set-off takes 
effect, that is, the moment at which both claims are set off against each 
other (below (b)).  
3.7 To answer those questions, the Advisory Council is guided by 
the following two considerations: On the one hand, the set-off must be 
declared (above, para. 3.2), and on the other hand, the set-off has the same 
effect as a payment (above, para. 2). 
3.8 (a) The declaration must reach the other party. As regards the question 
of when the declaration is considered as having been made, the CISG 
operates the distinction between communications that only become 
effective once they have been received by the other party (such as in 
Article 47 para. 2, 1st sentence, Article 63 para. 2, Article 65, or Article 79 
para. 4), and other communications. Those other communications are 
governed by Article 27 CISG. Although the wording of this provision 
deals only with the risk of delay and distortion, it is usually treated as also 
providing for the rule that a declaration becomes effective upon 
dispatch.45 
3.9 The rationale underlying Article 27 is that the addressee of the 
communication is the party in breach, and that it is therefore for that party 
to assume the risk of loss or delay in the transmission of the 
communication.46 Where neither party is in breach, or where the 
consequences triggered by the declaration are significant, the principle of 
receipt rather than the principle of dispatch applies. This must also hold 
true in relation to the declaration of set-off. Where the parties have mutual 
claims, none of the parties is ‘more in breach’ than the other; rather, both 
parties owe each other performance of their respective duty. Of course, it 
may be that one of the claims arises out of a breach of contract, e.g., where 
the buyer sets off a claim for damages against the seller’s claim for the 
purchase price. It might also be that both claims arise out of a breach of 
contract; this is the case where, e.g., the buyer claims an amount 
corresponding to the reduction of the purchase price to which it is entitled 
according to Article 50, and the seller holds a claim for interest because of 
late payment of the purchase price (Article 78). However, this is not 
decisive for the purposes of determining the appropriate rule regarding 
the point in time the set-off declaration is made. In fact, the rule in Article 
27 aims at putting the risk of loss or delay on the addressee in the course 
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of the execution of the sales contract, e.g., where the buyer notifies a non-
conformity (Article 39), or where buyer or seller fix an additional period 
of time for performance (Article 47 para. 1, Article 63 para. 1), claims 
performance (Article 46 para. 1, Article 62), or where a party terminates 
the contract (Article 26). In other words, Article 27 applies to situations in 
which the addressee is supposed to know that something in the execution 
of its obligations is ‘improper’ and calls for correct fulfilment. This is not 
the case with a set-off declaration, the only goal of which it is to inform 
the addressee of the fact that there will be a set-off instead of actual 
payment. The principle of Article 27 is thus not suited to be applied to a 
declaration of set-off, and it is the receipt rule rather than the dispatch rule 
that must apply to the declaration of set-off. This means that the 
declaration of set-off must reach the other party; if it is not received, the 
declaration must be considered as not having been made.  
3.10 This finding is corroborated by one further aspect. In fact, as 
set-off is understood as one way to perform a monetary obligation, that 
is, as an alternative to payment (above, para. 2), the rules of the CISG on 
the time of payment must be taken into account. In this regard, the 
Convention stands for the view that payment occurs once the creditor of 
the monetary claim has received it.47 Merely having initiated the payment 
process does not yet constitute payment. The rules on payment in the 
Convention thus follow the ‘receipt theory’, so to speak, and not the 
theory of dispatch. Applying this idea to set-off, it becomes evident that 
the notification with which set-off is declared must be received by the 
other party in order to be effective.  
3.11 (b) Set-off does not take effect before both claims are due. The moment 
in time at which set-off is declared must be distinguished from the 
moment a set-off becomes effective, that is, the time the claims are actually 
set off. Set-off, despite its assimilation to payment, rests on a declaration. 
Declarations can be made early (or retroactively) under the CISG; that is, 
what is stated in the declaration need not necessarily become effective 
immediately upon its having been declared. A party may, for example, 
declare the contract avoided in two weeks’ time, or may declare the 
contract avoided as of last week. The declaration of avoidance as such 
becomes effective upon dispatch, but the moment the declaration’s 
content takes effect is prior or later than that point in time. The same holds 
true for set-off, which may be declared before the claims are actually set 
off.  
3.12 As set-off has the same effect as payment (above, para. 2), it 
seems appropriate to determine the moment set-off takes effect according 
to the rules governing the claim for payment of the purchase price or other 
sums. According to Article 61 CISG, the right to claim the purchase price, 
or damages, requires that the buyer has failed to perform its contractual 
obligation. As long as performance is not due, the buyer who does not pay 
the price (or otherwise does not perform) is not in breach of contract. 
Similarly, according to Article 81(2), a claim to pay back the purchase price 
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cannot be raised as long as this duty to make restitution has not become 
due. The Convention thus establishes the rule that a monetary claim must 
be due in order to be claimable.48 Applied to set-off, as a set-off enables 
the party who relies on it to recover the claim that it has against the other 
party, the claim of the party declaring set-off must be due.49 As long as it 
is not due, a set-off, even if it has been declared, cannot have any effect. 
In fact, just as a party cannot claim payment before the due date, so the 
party who sets off instead of asking for actual payment must await the due 
date for recovering its claim by way of set-off.  
3.13 Another question is whether the claim against which set-off is 
declared must be due, too. In this regard, the Opinion bases its 
considerations on Article 58, which deals with the time of payment. In 
application of this provision, it has almost unanimously been held that the 
buyer is not entitled to pay earlier than at the date determined in the 
contract. In case of early payment, the seller can refuse its acceptance.50 
The seller who accepts early payment may reserve its right to 
compensation of possible exchange rate losses.51 The seller’s right to 
refuse acceptance of early payment, although not explicitly stated in Article 
58, corresponds to the deliberations and the finding of the Drafting 
Committee. As Schlechtriem states, ‘[w]hile a motion to clarify this point 
[i.e., the seller’s right to return the payment made before the due date] was 
rejected, it was nevertheless generally assumed that the seller could decline 
premature or partial payments. It was believed that only the question of 
whether the seller must return the money at once needed negotiation.’52 
3.14 This rule, derived by interpretation of Article 58, can be 
generalised for all sorts of monetary claims under the CISG and, in a next 
step, analogously applied to a set-off. In fact, as the debtor who relies on 
set-off is making a short-cut payment to the creditor (above, para. 2)., it 
should not be entitled to do so before the creditor’s claim has become 
due. Just as it is held to not be possible to impose acceptance of an early 
payment on the seller, set-off cannot take effect before the creditor’s claim 
is mature. Of course, as with actual payment, the creditor is free to accept 
set-off even if its monetary claim is not yet due. 
3.15 One further point that needs clarification in this respect is the 
moment a claim becomes due. This point in time is determined either by 
the contract or the CISG.53 Absent a parties’ agreement, the due date for 
a monetary claim is fixed, or can at least been derived, from the various 
provisions dealing with the different monetary claims. For instance, a 
claim for payment of the purchase price is governed by Article 58, which 
provides that, absent an agreement between the parties to the contrary, 
the price must be paid when the seller places the goods or documents 
controlling their disposition at the buyer’s disposal. A claim for damages 
becomes due at the moment the loss occurs.54 Interest on the purchase 
price that must be paid back after avoidance of the contract becomes due 
on the date the purchase price was originally paid,55 etc. Applied to a set-
off under the Convention, the question of when each of the claims 
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becomes due will depend on their nature. For example, a set-off of the 
seller’s claim for payment of the purchase price and the buyer’s claim for 
damages can take place at the earliest once the seller’s claim has become 
due (which can be the moment the seller places the goods at the buyer’s 
disposal or some other date before or after that point in time, depending 
on the parties’ agreement) and the buyer’s loss has occurred (which gives 
right to its damages claim, which is immediately due).  
3.16 Set-off has no retroactive effect. As set-off is seen as an 
alternative form of payment, its effect must be similar to the effect 
payment has. In case of actual payment, the party owing a monetary claim 
has performed its obligation at the moment the other party can dispose of 
the sum which is owed to it. As long as the first party has not paid, its 
obligation to pay persists. Likewise, if a party is in arrears with payment, it 
is bound to pay interest on the sum which is due until the moment it makes 
the payment (Article 78).56 If liquidated damages have been agreed on in 
case of late payment, the party who does not pay on time must pay the 
amount provided for in the liquidated damages clause. In other words, 
payment deploys its effect only for the future and is not dated back to 
some earlier point in time (ex-nunc-effect as opposed to ex-tunc-effect). 
3.17 The same must hold true for set-off. A set-off replaces actual 
payment of a monetary obligation. As long as it has not taken place, the 
debtor has not performed its obligation to pay. Thus, if the debtor sets off 
the claim that it has against the creditor after the creditor’s claim has 
become due, the debtor has been in arrears with payment during the 
period in which payment had to be effectuated but was not. The debtor 
must pay interest for that time and, as the case may be, liquidated damages 
or penalties. In other words, set-off must have an ex-nunc-effect, too, as 
does actual payment. There is no reason to treat the party who sets off 
better than the party that makes actual payment.  
3.18 The solutions found in certain civil law legislative instruments, 
according to which a set-off, once it has been evoked, dates back to the 
time the claims were eligible for set-off (above, paras 0.5 and 0.6), finds 
no support under the CISG. There are historical reasons for the 
retroactive effect of set-off under those legislative instruments that have 
no legitimate basis under the Convention. Rather, set-off under the CISG 
must be derived from the Convention itself, in particular from its rules on 
payment, according to which the debtor has not fulfilled its obligation 
until the sum is paid. 
2.2.4.  4. EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO SET OFF DOES NOT REQUIRE THE 
CLAIMS TO BE LIQUIDATED OR TO BE IN THE SAME CURRENCY. 
4.1 Set-off need not be expressed in the same currency. Quite 
often, the claims to be set off will be expressed in different currencies, for 
example, where a claim for payment of the purchase price is set off against 
a claim for damages. Whereas the parties will usually have agreed on the 
currency in which the purchase price must be paid, the currency of the 
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damages claim will normally be the one in which that party suffered the 
loss,57 which usually is its place of business.58 As the case may be, the loss 
might also occur in another currency, for example, where the loss consists 
in expenditure incurred in debt collection.59  
4.2 Unlike, e.g., the PICC 2016, the CISG does not specifically 
address questions of currency or, more specifically, the question of 
whether a monetary claim expressed in a certain currency may be fulfilled 
in another currency. However, most authors and tribunals agree that 
currency is a question governed by the Convention.60  
4.3 For the question of whether a set-off may take place where the 
claims are not in the same currency, Article 88(3) and Article 84 are of 
guidance. The first provision states a party’s right to retain out of the 
proceeds of sale ‘an amount equal to the reasonable expenses of 
preserving the goods and of selling them’. The provision also applies 
where the buyer reselling the goods on the seller’s account had already 
paid the purchase price. In this case, the seller must pay back the purchase 
price in the currency that was fixed for the payment of the purchase 
price,61 whereas the buyer must account ‘for the proceeds of the sale’ 
(Article 88(3)). Those will be in the currency agreed on for the resale with 
the third party and may thus differ from the currency in which the seller 
has to make restitution of the purchase price. Similarly, Article 84 provides 
that the seller who is bound to refund the price must pay interest on it, 
whilst the buyer must account to the seller for all benefits derived from 
the goods. It is generally admitted that the claims can be set off.62 At the 
same time, not infrequently, the two claims will not be expressed in the 
same currency. In fact, interest on the price to be paid back is held to be 
payable in the currency of payment,63 whereas the benefits for which the 
buyer must account will often have arisen in another currency, probably 
in the currency of the buyer’s country.  
4.4 Thus, both Article 84 and Article 88(3) provide for a set-off of 
claims of different currencies. The rule can be generalised to the effect 
that a set-off should be possible even if the claims are expressed in 
different currencies. This principle finds its limits where the claim that is 
used to declare set-off is expressed in a non-convertible currency, as this 
would make it impossible to determine the amount of that claim and thus 
also the amount that has been set off. The addressee of the set-off 
declaration who suffers currency losses will have a claim for damages 
under Article 74.64 
4.5 The rule will not apply where the parties have excluded the right 
to set off claims of different currency. As the case may be, it may matter 
to a party to receive payment in a foreign currency which is stronger or 
more reliable than its own currency, or that party might wish to receive 
payment only in one particular currency, e.g., the currency of its place of 
business. The contract may provide for individual or standard foreign 
currency clauses to make it clear that payment in a currency other than the 
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agreed one is excluded. A set-off of claims expressed in different 
currencies is not possible in that case. 
4.6 The claims need not be liquidated. Set-off under the 
Convention will often involve a claim for damages, mostly on behalf of 
the party who declares the set-off. Not infrequently, the amount of the 
loss which is claimed will not yet be determined (‘liquidated’). Rule No. 4 
adopts the view that set-off is not precluded in such a case. This is based 
on considerations developed in the light of the rules of the Convention 
on interest (Article 78). Under the CISG, interest starts to accrue from the 
moment a ‘sum is in arrears’. As far as damages are concerned, they 
become due as soon as the loss occurs (above, para. 3.15). Therefore, the 
party in breach of contract is in arrears from the day the loss occurred and 
has to pay interest on the claim for damages from that date on, regardless 
of whether the exact amount of the loss has been established or not.65 The 
term ‘sum’ used in Article 78 thus includes unliquidated monetary claims. 
In other words, the debtor of a damages claim, the exact amount of which 
is yet to be determined, is under an obligation to pay a sum which is likely 
to cover the creditor’s loss in order to avoid having to pay interest accruing 
on that sum.66  
4.7 For the sake of consistency in the interpretation of the 
Convention’s notions, a ‘sum’ (‘monetary claim’) in relation to a set-off 
must involve unliquidated sums, too. It would be inconsistent for a debtor 
of a damages claim to be bound to pay a sum approximately covering the 
loss incurred (in order to avoid too high a sum of interest accruing on it),  
but not to be allowed to fulfil that same payment obligation by setting off 
its claim that it has against the creditor. Likewise, set-off must be possible 
where the claim which is used to declare set off is not yet ascertained as to 
its amount. Whether it is the claim that is put to set-off which is 
unliquidated or whether the claim of the other party is not yet ascertained 
as to its amount, in both cases the risk lies on the party setting off its claim 
to do so in an amount that is likely to correspond to the unliquidated claim. 
For example, if the debtor of an unliquidated damages claim estimates that 
the loss will amount to 50,000 € and sets off its payment claim in that same 
amount against the first party, and if it later turns out that the loss is 60,000 
€, that same debtor has been in arrears with payment in the amount of 
10,000 € since the occurrence of the loss. Similarly, if the debtor of a 
payment claim of 50,000 € sets off with a claim for damages that it expects 
to amount to 50,000 € as well, whereas its loss is later fixed at 40’000 €, it 
will have been late on payment of the purchase price since the moment 
the other party’s claim for payment was due.  
4.8 Questions for which no rules can be derived from the CISG. 
Having shown that rules can be derived from the general principles on 
which the CISG is based that can be applied to a set-off of CISG-internal 
claims, there are a number of questions regarding set-off where this is not 
possible. For instance, the question may be raised whether a set-off is 
possible where one of the parties has become insolvent, or where one of 
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the claims is time-barred, or where a claim which initially existed between 
the parties has been assigned to a third party. These situations involve 
matters that are, generally speaking, outside the scope of the Convention.67 
This does not constitute an obstacle to the application of the CISG to a 
set-off.  
4.9 Just as, in a sales contract governed by the CISG, matters of 
insolvency, prescription, or assignment are resolved in application of the 
respective domestic laws, or international rules of law, a set-off that would 
raise similar questions will have to comply with the applicable respective 
rules, notwithstanding the fact that the aspects that do not concern ‘CISG-
external’ matters will remain governed by the Convention.  
4.10 More precisely, for the question of set-off in insolvency, the 
decisive factor must be the extent to which the applicable domestic law 
regulates the operation and the effect of set-off in a mandatory manner. 
In fact, insolvency set-off may differ significantly from one legal system 
to the other, e.g., as concerns the automatic effect of set-off as soon as a 
party enters insolvency proceedings (as is the case in English law) or, in 
other jurisdictions, the date up to which a set-off is possible, whether 
insolvency set-off is mandatory or can be excluded by agreement, the date 
at which the account is taken, the requirements as to the nature of the 
claims that are set off, etc.68 If the insolvency proceedings do not modify 
the way set-off operates but merely provides for a cut-off date after which 
no set-off is possible, it is the CISG that governs the question of whether 
the requirements for a set-off are met; domestic law in that case only states 
whether the party relying on set-off may still do so after commencement 
of the insolvency proceedings.69 In contrast, where, according to the 
applicable insolvency law, the entering of a party into insolvency 
proceedings actually creates a (new) set-off situation, this insolvency set-
off is, in its entirety, subject to domestic law.  
4.11 If the question arises whether the claim with which set-off is 
declared is time-barred, and whether it may still be set off against the other 
party’s claim, the fact that the CISG does not provide for rules on 
prescription does not hinder its application to the other aspects of the set-
off; just as in any other CISG-contract, the question of prescription, 
including its effects, must be resolved in conformity with the law, or rules 
of law, applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law (Article 
7 para. 2 in fine); the other points (e.g., the question of how set-off is 
brought about, questions of currency, ex-nunc effect of a set-off, etc.) 
remain governed by the CISG. The same holds true where the question 
arises of whether and under what conditions a party to a CISG-contract 
may set off its claim against the other party’s claim where that other party 
has assigned its claim to a third party, or where one of the parties has 
acquired a claim against the other party from a third party by way of 
assignment: in the absence of any provision on the matter in the CISG, 
the specific question of whether a set-off of claims that have been assigned 
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is governed by the otherwise applicable rules of law, such as the PICC,70 
or the applicable domestic law (Article 7 para. 2 in fine).  
4.12 Finally, many domestic laws, and rules of law such as the PICC, 
prohibit set-off by law in certain constellations. Often, set-off is barred 
with regard to claims that cannot be transferred by law, such as salaries 
and pensions of civil service employees, or with regard to claims based on 
intentional civil wrongs. In other words, set-off is prohibited essentially 
where vital claims are concerned, or claims aimed at the compensation of 
gross injustice. The CISG does not address these questions and does not 
establish general prohibition rules, as this is outside its scope (Article 4). 
Thus, no rule can be derived from the CISG as to whether set-off is 
prohibited in certain situations. However, exactly because the set-off 
restrictions provided for in domestic laws concern claims that do not fall 
within the scope of the CISG, the absence of rules in this respect that 
would be derivable from the Convention is irrelevant. In fact, the CISG 
has the authority to consider itself applicable only with respect to matters 
that fall within its scope, and it thus applies to a set-off only to the extent 
that the claims that are set off are governed by it. This concerns claims for 
payment of the purchase price or monetary contractual claims for breach 
of contract (above, para. 1.6). The set-off of such claims does not raise the 
question of its admissibility. The fact that the CISG does not provide for 
rules on prohibition of set-off is thus not be an obstacle to the application 
of the Convention to a CISG-internal set-off.  
2.2.5.  5. THE APPLICATION OF THE CISG TO A SET-OFF DOES NOT AFFECT 
MATTERS OF RES JUDICATA OR COUNTERCLAIMS. 
5.1 The rule must be read together with rule No. 1, which states that 
monetary claims governed by the CISG may be set off in conformity with 
the general principles of the Convention, regardless of whether they arise 
out of the same contract or not. The latter rule has been adopted because 
the application of the CISG to a set-off does not affect matters of res 
judicata (below, paras 5.7 and 5.8) or the possibility of a counterclaim 
(below, para. 5.9), and affects the question of judicial competence only to 
the extent the set-off under the CISG operates as a defence to the claim 
and not as an independent set-off of procedural nature (below, paras 5.4 
et seq).  
5.2 Judicial competence. As a world-wide undisputed rule, the 
question of whether a court or arbitral tribunal is competent to hear a 
claim is a matter of civil procedural law or arbitration law as the case may 
be. A set-off may raise rather difficult questions where the claims to be set 
off would not be subject to the same jurisdiction, were they raised 
individually. In contract law matters, this situation arises if the claims arise 
out of different contracts which do not have the same jurisdiction. The 
scenarios may vary: it may be that the claim against which set-off is 
declared arises out of a contract that is subject to a jurisdiction clause, 
whereas the contract out of which the second claim arises is not, and vice 
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versa. It is possible that different forum selection clauses exist for both 
contracts, conferring, as the case may be, exclusive jurisdiction to the 
respective prorogated court. Other constellations include claims arising 
out of contracts that are subject to different and diverging arbitration 
clauses, or claims originating from contracts of which the first one is 
subject to arbitration and the second one subject to state court jurisdiction, 
or vice versa.  
5.3 If a party brings a claim before the court or arbitral tribunal 
competent to hear that claim and the defendant raises a right of set-off 
(which may either consist in the assertion that a set-off has taken place, or 
that the court or arbitral tribunal seized pronounce the set-off in the 
proceedings), the question arises whether the court or arbitral tribunal may 
hear the set-off defence.71 This will depend on the applicable laws or rules 
of the forum or place of arbitration, on the one hand, and the specific 
constellation in which the question arises, on the other hand.72 Broadly 
speaking, the following approaches are either provided by law or applied 
by courts and arbitral tribunals: the court seized by the first party is 
competent to hear the set-off defence despite the absence of jurisdiction 
over the claim of the party relying on set-off; or the court stays the 
proceedings on the first claim, or execution, pending resolution of the 
second claim in the other jurisdiction; or the court declines to hear the set-
off defence.73 Where the first claim is subject to an arbitration clause 
whereas the second claim is not, or is subject to another arbitration clause, 
approaches also differ. To the extent the arbitration agreement cannot be 
interpreted conclusively, the question whether set-off will be entertained 
by the arbitral tribunal will depend on the approach taken in the applicable 
laws or rules or adopted by the arbitral tribunal. The approaches vary and 
are altogether similar to those developed under state court jurisdiction, 
even though the general trend moves towards an ‘attraction of 
competence’, that is, the permissibility of set-off despite lacking 
jurisdiction over the claim relied upon for the purposes of set-off.74 
Finally, the first claim may be subject to state court jurisdiction whereas 
the second claim is subject to an arbitration clause. Again, different courts 
have come to different solutions as regards the question of whether the 
court that has been seized should entertain the set-off defence.75  
5.4 Allowing or not allowing the set-off defence to be heard, staying 
the proceedings, or proceeding yet in another manner: that question is, in 
principle, not linked to the one on the applicability of the CISG to a set-
off. Applying the Convention to CISG-internal claims does not modify 
the existing rules on judicial competence, which remains a question of civil 
procedure law or arbitration law as the case may be. A court may thus, in 
application of its procedural lex fori, refuse to hear a set-off defence if the 
claim of the party that relies on set-off is subject to an arbitration clause.76 
From a comparative perspective, this is quite obvious for civil law legal 
systems, which consider set-off as a matter of substantive law and where 
there is a priori no overlap between the question of which law is applied to 
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the set-off and the question of whether a court or arbitral tribunal may 
entertain the set-off defence. For legal systems where set-off is, in the first 
place, an instrument of procedural law, the divide between applicable law 
and competence to hear the set-off might be less obvious, but those 
systems also have well known situations in which a set-off operates as a 
substantive defence to the claim. This is particularly the case in situations 
with which this Opinion is concerned, that is, in sales contracts arising out 
of the same contract or transaction.77 The position taken here is thus less 
foreign to sales laws of common law jurisdiction than it could seem at first 
glance, even though one should not overemphasise similarities with 
domestic concepts, as the approach under the CISG is autonomously 
derived from within the Convention and is independent from solutions 
found under national laws.  
5.5 Rule 1 in conjunction with Rule 5 thus states that the set-off of 
claims arising out of a contract governed by the CISG takes place 
according to the rules derived by the CISG. The rule does not raise 
questions of competence, as both the first and the second claim originate 
from the same contract, and the forum or arbitral tribunal competent to 
hear the dispute is the one chosen in the contract or determined in 
application of the relevant procedural rules.78 The court or arbitral tribunal 
competent to hear the first claim is also competent to adjudicate the 
question of a set-off (always provided that the set-off concerns CISG-
internal claims). This is not precluded by the fact that, in the absence of a 
specific party agreement, several places of jurisdiction may be possible for 
the contractual dispute.  
5.6 Rule 1 further states that a set-off of claims arising out of 
different contracts both governed by the CISG operates according to the 
rules derived from the CISG and has the effect provided by it. The 
application of the CISG is thus not limited to a set-off arising out of the 
same contract. In fact, there is no valid reason to consider that, where the 
set-off concerns claims from the same contract, the CISG provides for 
general principles governing the set-off, but does not so provide where 
similar claims, though arising from different transactions, are set off.  
5.7 This approach does not modify the existing procedural rules on 
judicial competence as such. However, as with the requirements for set-
off of CISG-internal clauses, its operation and its effect are governed by 
the Convention. Further, as a set-off under the Convention need not be 
asserted before a court or arbitral tribunal and does not depend on a 
judgment or award, a set-off of CISG-internal claims constitutes a defence 
to the main claim provided for by the Convention, that is, by substantive 
law. A court whose domestic law provides for procedural set-off can 
therefore not simply apply the criteria applicable to a set-off under its own 
law but must take account of the fact that the set-off it is asked to 
adjudicate is a matter of unified sales law. For example, a court which, in 
applying its own procedural law, would deal with a set-off only where a 
claim is liquidated cannot bar the defendant’s unliquidated set-off defence 
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where the set-off is governed by the CISG. This is because the Convention 
allows for a set-off of unliquidated claims (above, paras 3.16 and 3.17).  
5.8 Res judicata. Where the parties’ dispute is brought before a 
court or arbitral tribunal, the latter will admit or deny that the claims have 
been set off. The question may arise whether each of the claims may 
independently be raised in a new trial or whether the fact that there has 
been a judicial decision in the matter precludes adjudication by another 
court. The problem, known as res judicata (preclusion), is subject to the 
applicable procedural law. Generally speaking, in civil law countries, res 
judicata applies only to the operative part of the judgment (dispositif du 
jugement; fallo de la sentencia; prononcé; Urteilstenor). For example, 
where the defendant in a law suit argues that the plaintiff’s claim must be 
rejected in the amount the defendant has a claim that it has set off and the 
court follows this argument by approving the plaintiff’s claim only to the 
extent it exceeds the defendant’s set-off claim, the operative part of the 
judgment will be ‘Order to pay X and dismissal of the remainder of the 
plaintiff’s claim’. The reason why part of the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed 
– the fact that the defendant could rely on set-off – is just the motive and 
does not belong to the operative part of the judgment. However, by now, 
most domestic procedural rules contain a rule which extends res judicata to 
set-off,79 or which entitles the plaintiff to demand an interim decision on 
the existence or non-existence of a right of set-off.80 Res judicata in 
common law is considerably stricter than in civil law. Broadly speaking, a 
final judgment on the merits has to be reached for it to be conclusive 
between the parties as to all matters that were litigated or that could have 
been litigated in that action, which includes claims there were brought as 
a set-off in the proceedings, or could have been brought but were not.81 
The principle of res judicata has also been upheld in arbitration law.82  
5.9 The procedural rules on res judicata remain unaffected by the 
application of the CISG to set-off. The question of the law applicable to 
set-off and the matter of res judicata are separate questions. The CISG 
governs the question of whether the claims have been set off. Whether 
another court, or an arbitral tribunal, may come back to the question of 
whether there has been a set-off is a matter of procedural law.  
5.10 Counterclaim. Finally, the application of the CISG to a set-off 
has no impact on the question of whether the claim in dispute can be 
brought as a counterclaim instead of being set off against the plaintiff’s 
claim. Even though the terminology is not everywhere the same, and that 
under the US American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, e.g., the term 
‘counterclaim’ includes (procedurally operating) set-off,83 there are 
important differences between a set-off under the CISG and a 
counterclaim as it is habitually defined. From a comparative perspective, 
the most important difference is that a counterclaim requires a pending 
action, that is, it operates only before a court or arbitral tribunal. A 
counterclaim has the advantage that it enables the defendant to enforce its 
claim against the plaintiff even if the proceedings have been initiated by 
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the plaintiff, and it may exceed the amount claimed by the plaintiff. 
Depending on the applicable procedural law, a counterclaim may also 
allow third parties to be involved in the litigation. However, a 
counterclaim requires a pending action, can be subject to time limits and 
formalities, has an effect on the court fees and the bearing of the costs of 
procedure, and usually requires that the counterclaim can be conducted in 
the same type of proceedings as the action.84 All those aspects, in particular 
availability, requirements and effects of a counterclaim, are subject to the 
procedural lex fori or lex arbitri. A counterclaim is thus an instrument that 
differs from any type of domestic set-off, also from procedurally operating 
set-off, and that differs considerably from a set-off under the CISG. For 
a party confronted with a claim arising from a sales contract, set-off and 
counterclaim presen85t different possibilities to react, depending on the 
circumstances of the case. Obviously, where a party decides to raise a 
counterclaim rather than to rely on a set-off, in the merits, its claim will be 
governed by the CISG, but the applicability of the Convention is limited 
to it, and the admissibility and operation of the counterclaim is subject to 
the applicable procedural law.  
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